Abstract

Epistemic virtue theory has run into the problem of passive perceptions—forms of knowledge achieved through a process so trivial that it seems wrong to argue that it relies on virtue. In defense of epistemic virtue, I argue that even such simple forms of knowledge rely on virtue. I address the critique, focusing on its formulation by Jason Baehr, by first examining some of its intuitive appeal, some of which comes from an implicit assumption that virtue cannot be ubiquitous. I dismiss this critique as misrepresenting the core commitments of general virtue theory. I then establish a causal account linking virtue and passive perception through the process of habituation. To achieve the ability to acquire knowledge passively, one has to employ epistemic virtue to habituate oneself as a good perceiver. I show that this is especially evident in cases where supposedly passively-achieved knowledge becomes harder to achieve, such as under time-stress or when living with disability. Finally, I demonstrate that the stakes of this discussion are not merely semantic but are important for an idea of epistemic responsibility. People have responsibilities to know certain things, and those responsibilities sometimes require habituating oneself to be a better passive perceiver.