Minimal Structural Requirements for Consistent Ontology

Abstract

If something exists, identity, distinction, and relation are unavoidable. This paper examines the logical status of absolute nothingness and argues that it is descriptively unstable: any attempt to reference or describe such a state necessarily introduces structure, thereby contradicting its definition. Building on a previously developed argument for this instability, the paper derives a minimal set of structural principles required for any ontology to be consistently and nontrivially describable. It is proven that three principles—identity, distinction, and relation—form a minimal and irreducible triad necessary for contradiction-free description. No proper subset of these principles is sufficient to sustain a coherent ontology in general. The result is framework-neutral, pre-physical, and does not assume space, time, dynamics, or causation. Rather than proposing a theory of reality, the paper establishes logical constraints that any coherent formal, mathematical, or physical theory must respect. As such, it is intended as a foundational contribution to ontology, philosophy of science, and the logical preconditions of theoretical frameworks.

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unknown Searcy, Kenneth (2026) "Minimal Structural Requirements for Consistent Ontology".

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