On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the Name

Law and Philosophy 28 (3):233 - 260 (2009)
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Abstract

Argues that content-independent reasons are intentions. Relies on Grice's distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. Rejects previous accounts, and argues that his account can understand the force of such reasons appropriately, through the conept of enabling-conditions. Illustrates through several paridigmatic types of content-independent reasons.

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10.1007/s10982-008-9037-7

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Stefan Sciaraffa
McMaster University

Citations of this work

Authority and Reason‐Giving.David Enoch - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
In defense of content-independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
Resentment and Indignation: Communicative but Not Demands.Coleen Macnamara - forthcoming - In Max Lewis & Antti Kauppinen, Moral Psychology of Resentment. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Authority.Thomas Christiano - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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