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Illusion of sense of self-agency: discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership
Cognition 94 (3):241-255 (2005)
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Citations of this work
Toward a second-person neuroscience.Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht, Kai Vogeley & Leonhard Schilbach - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Recommendations for Responsible Development and Application of Neurotechnologies.Sara Goering, Eran Klein, Laura Specker Sullivan, Anna Wexler, Blaise Agüera Y. Arcas, Guoqiang Bi, Jose M. Carmena, Joseph J. Fins, Phoebe Friesen, Jack Gallant, Jane E. Huggins, Philipp Kellmeyer, Adam Marblestone, Christine Mitchell, Erik Parens, Michelle Pham, Alan Rubel, Norihiro Sadato, Mina Teicher, David Wasserman, Meredith Whittaker, Jonathan Wolpaw & Rafael Yuste - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):365-386.
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach.Matthew R. Longo, Friederike Schüür, Marjolein P. M. Kammers, Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):978-998.
Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.
References found in this work
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning.Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Müsseler, Gisa Aschersleben & Wolfgang Prinz - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):849-878.
Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod - 1997 - Cognition 65 (1):71-86.
Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control: With special reference to the ideo-motor mechanism.Anthony G. Greenwald - 1970 - Psychological Review 77 (2):73-99.
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