Methodological pluralism, normative naturalism and the realist aim of science

In Robert Nola & Howard Sankey, After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 211-229 (2000)
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Abstract

There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.

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Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science.Howard Sankey - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):5-20.
Aimless science.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1211-1221.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
The structure of scientific revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1970 - Chicago,: University of Chicago Press.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.

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