Abstract

Moral philosophers associated with the Platonic-Kantian tradition have considered emotions to be of dubious value for the moral character since they are apt to lead reason astray, and reason is the faculty that guides responsible action. According to this view morality is a predominantly rational endeavor the main aim of which is to establish principles for conduct. ;In this dissertation I argue for a different philosophical approach to moral theory, one suggested earlier by Aristotle and Hume and now being revived and elaborated by contemporary moral theorists. In this view, the role of emotions in morality is interpreted in a more positive way than rationalist philosophy tends to do. One of the main tenets of this position is that a moral character requires an integration of reason and emotions. ;The first two chapters of this work treat contemporary and traditional approaches to emotions, focussing on Patricia Greenspan and Ronald de Sousa. This discussion is meant to provide a framework for arguing for the essential role of emotions in the moral life. A defense of this claim in the allowing chapters will revolve around two main issues. In chapter III I examine moral motivation and claim that emotions are always present in moral action . Chapters IV and V examine the relation between emotions and reason in the moral agent. Chapter IV in particular seeks to establish that emotions are essential components of the moral character. Chapter V discusses the limits that the criterion of rationality seems to place on what is considered to be valuable or justified. In this last chapter I suggest that validation of emotions is not just proving their rationality for emotions have moral import whether they are rational or not. ;The general purpose of the dissertation is to discredit the omission of emotions from the moral life, an omission that leads to what I believe to be a distorted view of the moral individual and morality