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Truth-reliability and the evolution of human cognitive faculties
Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):95-106 (2004)
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Citations of this work
Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition.Benjamin James Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.
Theoretical considerations on cognitive niche construction.Tommaso Bertolotti & Lorenzo Magnani - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4757-4779.
The “evolutionary argument” and the metaphilosophy of commonsense.Stephen J. Boulter - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):877-889.
References found in this work
Without Good Reason.Edward Stein - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):234-237.
Three cheers for propositional attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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