Motivating the relevant alternatives approach

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279 (2006)
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Abstract

But it’s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of ‘ruling out’ and ‘relevance’ that has tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn’t? No; the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with the specific elaborations of the core RA claim that various theorists have offered; for these elaborations have typically involved some rather controversial claims and/or assumptions, and it is against these claims/assumptions that the bulk of the criticism of the whole RA approach has been directed.

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Patrick Rysiew
University of Victoria

References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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