The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action

In Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff, Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford (2010)
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Abstract

Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.

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David-Hillel Ruben
Birkbeck, University of London

Citations of this work

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action.Jonathan D. Payton - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):20-33.

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