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A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games
Synthese 171 (2):291 - 320 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper I present a dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for reasoning about information and intention changes in situations of strategic interaction. I provide a complete axiomatization for this logic, and then use it to study intentions-based transformations of decision problems.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Collective obligations, group plans and individual actions.Allard Tamminga & Hein Duijf - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):187-214.
Epistemic GDL: A logic for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games.Guifei Jiang, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel & Heng Zhang - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 294 (C):103453.
Recognition-primed group decisions via judgement aggregation.Marija Slavkovik & Guido Boella - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):51-65.
References found in this work
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press.
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Reasoning about knowledge.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Vardi - 2003 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Modal Logic: Graph. Darst.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema.
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