Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214 (2000)
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Abstract

Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state

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David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center

References found in this work

Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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