Abstract

Bertrand Russell’s mature philosophy – logical atomism, neutral monism, and his systematic rejection of the soul – represents one of the most ambitious attempts to dissolve the first‑person perspective into a network of logically ordered sense‑data and events. This paper argues that Russell’s project fails because it cannot satisfy two necessary conditions for genuine subjectivity: existential vulnerability and non‑duplicability. The Dual‑Closure Framework, developed across a series of works, demonstrates that any coherent account of consciousness and moral obligation must be anchored in a singular, vulnerable, non‑duplicable subject. Russell’s neutral monism, by contrast, reduces the “I” to a logical construction or a bundle of events, thereby losing the situated, bounded perspective that makes inwardness possible. The paper concludes that Russell’s legacy – however powerful in logic and epistemology – leaves no room for the irreplaceable, morally accountable self. The Dual‑Closure Framework does not reject analytic method; it completes it by identifying the ontological constraints that any such analysis must respect. All works in the Dual‑Closure Series are freely available on PhilArchive.