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A new resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem
Mind 120 (479):637 - 670 (2011)
Abstract
A paper on how to adapt your probabilisitc beliefs when learning a conditionalAuthor Profiles
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Citations of this work
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Updating, Undermining, and Independence.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.
Learning from Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
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