A Materialist Fallacy of Mind

Philosophy 45 (173):227 - 230 (1970)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

… once it be granted that the concept of a mental state is the concept of a state of the person apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour, the identification of these states with physico-chemical states of the brain is, in the present state of knowledge, nearly as good a bet as the identification of the gene with the DNA molecule.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Patrick K. Bastable - 1968 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17:343-345.
Identity theory, Multiple Realizability and Functionalism.M. Akand - 2018 - Pabna University of Science and Technology Studies 3:79-86.
Armstrong’s Concept of a Mental State.David R. Hiley - 1973 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-2):113-118.
Three Dogmas of Functionalism.Andrew Hampton Gleeson - 1998 - Dissertation, The Australian National University (Australia)
A Rediscovery of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Consciousness and Cognition 3 (2):223-245.
Nagel's challenge and the mind-body problem.Rom Harré - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (2):247-270.
The myth of the hidden.William E. S. McNeill - 2009 - Dissertation, University College London

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
69 (#861,626)

6 months
8 (#1,301,128)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.

Add more references