Abstract

In his ‘On the Explanation of Intentionality’, Tim Crane (2024) disputes an influential argument for the claim that mental representations must represent via some non-intrinsic connection, which he ascribes to Putnam. Putnam's argument would establish what Crane calls ‘the aboutness assumption’, that is, that the question what makes it the case that any mental state is about something has to be answered without using any intentional notions. Crane disputes this assumption by arguing that arguments in its favour, such as Putnam's argument, have hidden premises which for themselves would establish the conclusion. For instance, according to Crane, one of the reasons why we believe that Putnam's argument is sound is physicalism.In this paper, I will strengthen Crane’s objection to Putnam’s argument by arguing that even physicalism is compatible with the claim that (at least some) mental representations represent intrinsically. For example, I will argue that Recanati’s theory which takes Fregean modes of representation to be mental files not only entails that mental files represent intrinsically, but also that they are physically realised in the brains of the agents. I will then further challenge Putnam's claim that mental representations must represent via some non-intrinsic connection by arguing that independent of whether we conceive of modes of presentation as mental files, the existence of modes of presentation would speak against Putnam's thesis.