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MacFarlane on relative truth
Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100 (2006)
Abstract
John MacFarlane has made relativism popular again. Focusing just on his original discussion, I argue that the data he uses to motivate the position do not, in fact, motivatie it at all. Many of the points made here have since been made, independently, by Hermann Cappelen and John Hawthorne, in their book Relativism and Monadic Truth.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time.Dilip Ninan - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):465-492.
Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents?Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
References found in this work
Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore - 2008 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by John McDowell.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul Aaron Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Insensitive Semantics. A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):148-152.
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