Abstract

This article examines Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflection on philosophy: its method, its scope, and its relationship with other knowledge as central elements of the philosophical proposal the author developed in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Therefore, my proposal is to rehearse a metaphilosophical reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks about philosophy in TLP focusing, on the one hand, on his reflections on philosophy as an activity and not as a theory; on the other hand, on his categorical differentiation established between philosophical elucidations and scientific explanations. This proposal differs from the readings that interpret it is through the construction of a theory of meaning -or logical doctrine- that one can distinguish philosophical nonsense and see the world correctly. It also differs from Tractatus’s non-theoretical or quietist readings which understand philosophical elucidations as exclusively negative or critical nonsense. My aim is to highlight a positive aspect of philosophical elucidations that I will call performative. From my metaphilosophical reading, not only does the activity of clarification work as a critical sieve that separates what makes sense from what does not –with no theory; but it also makes a modification -a transformation- in the one who establishes it. These performative aspects imply emphasizing that there is a change in the way we see the world but also in the way we ‘see’ language, meaning, logic, science, philosophy, life, etc. Thus, the refusal to elaborate a theory or to offer scientific explanations does not turn the philosophical elucidations in TLP into a mode of self-destructive attack on all kinds of philosophy. On the contrary, these elucidations are part of the defense of a particular way of practicing it.