Public Philosophy in Prisons

In Lee McIntyre, Nancy McHugh & Ian Olasov, A companion to public philosophy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 337–346 (2022)
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Abstract

Narratives have allowed us to show the limits of positivism in humanistic disciplines and to challenge dominant presuppositions. A recent development in feminist philosophy, epistemic injustice describes the ways in which marginalized peoples are unfairly deprived of the ability to participate in society's knowledge‐ and meaning‐making practices. Marginalized groups can respond with their own ways of thinking, speaking, acting, and organizing, thus resisting an oppressive status quo. Much like an economic monopoly, a “hermeneutical monopoly” exists where people are forced, both by coercion and by lack of alternatives, to consume and use the dominant hermeneutical resources. The chapter describes an overlooked problem in the context of mass incarceration and thus to point to the need for a solution. The problem is the hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical marginalization of prisoners, which is not adequately addressed by scholars who simply attend to the narratives of the oppressed.

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Citations of this work

Moral Testimony and Epistemic Privilege.James Chamberlain - 2024 - Metaphilosophy 55 (4-5):582–594.
A Companion to Public Philosophy.Amanda Fulford - 2023 - Precollege Philosophy and Public Practice 5:44-48.

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