An adverbial meinongian theory

Analysis 39 (March):75-81 (1979)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's 1904 Theory of Objects is the act-content-object analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory need not be based on this analysis, but that an adverbial theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against an objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
239 (#171,257)

6 months
34 (#262,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

William J. Rapaport
State University of New York, Buffalo

Citations of this work

Non-propositional intentionality: an introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague, Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The problem of non-existents.Kit Fine - 1982 - Topoi 1 (1-2):97-140.
Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing.William J. Rapaport - 2012 - International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations