Ramsification and inductive inference

Synthese 187 (2):569-577 (2012)
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Abstract

An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.

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10.1007/s11229-010-9861-9

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Photo of Panu Raatikainen
Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

Citations of this work

Rudolf Carnap.Hannes Leitgeb & André Carus - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Chalmers' Blueprint of the World.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):113-128.

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References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.

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