A definition of degree of confirmation for very rich languages

Philosophy of Science 23 (1):58-62 (1956)
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Abstract

Carnap's system of inductive logic has very often been criticized on the ground that “degree of confirmation” is defined only for languages which are extremely over-simplified. Allegedly, it would be very difficult—and perhaps impossible—to define it adequately for languages formalized within the higher predicate calculi, or languages equivalent to these in richness, and it is such languages that would be needed were we ever to formalize the language of empirical science as a whole. Thus, this criticism bears not only on Carnap's work, but on all attempts to construct an exact analysis of induction from this particular standpoint; that is, from the standpoint of “logical measure functions.”

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References found in this work

Mathematical logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1951 - Cambridge,: Harvard University Press.
Mathematical Logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1940 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

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