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Conditional probabilities
Analysis 72 (3):488-491 (2012)
Abstract
A simple argument is given that shows that conditional probabilities do not supervene on unconditional probabilities. In particular, one cannot in general define conditional probabilities using the ratio formula P ( U | V ) = P ( U & V )/ P ( U ), or using any more sophisticated method based on unconditional probabilitiesAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Learning not to be Naïve: A comment on the exchange between Perrine/Wykstra and Draper.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Trent Dougherty Justin McBrayer, Skeptical Theism: New Essays (Oxford University Press). Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
References found in this work
A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
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