The Thomistic Perception of the Person and Human Rights

Studia Gilsoniana 6 (1):131-152 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea of human rights is connected to the modern perception of law founded on subjectivity, in the context of which rights are authorizations of individual action versus a higher authority, resulting in a subjectivity of law. The huge importance of the thomistic perception of the person is connected with the issue of relations between the individual and society, as well as relations between law and state, since Thomas Aquinas foresaw what we call ‘rights of man’. Thus, the person, in a metaphysical context, is associated with natural order, since natural sociability forms the basis of a person’s supernatural fulfillment. Because of his social nature, the person is also a carrier of social relations and a product of his own encounter with other persons. In this way, Thomas Aquinas makes a synthesis of man per se, as part of mankind, and man as a person vis-à-vis others in the sphere of justice, consisting ‘in rendering to each one his right’. Ius is a relation of justice concerning what is right (iustum) from the point of view of the other, “to whom something is due.” Aquinas can be considered a forerunner of human rights of the modern era, as demonstrated by the issue of natural equity, the issue of unjust law and obedience and the issue of political legitimization. In this framework, “human” or “natural” rights are considered moral rights. However, in the sphere of law they are perceived only within the community and common good, by no means constituting exclusive and absolute rights but only rights corresponding with duties and obligations. The Thomistic approach expresses both the free side of man vis-à-vis the state and its structures (in the spiritual level) and the egalitarian demand of law within social relations. Furthermore, it places the sphere of law on the background of common good and common interest. The Thomistic approach of the human person is a response to the modern perception of legal subjectivity and the priority of individuals, associated with the ideology of rights and leading to a confrontation of individual and society and a division of man to natural man and citizen, a product of the antithesis between society and state.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Human Rights and Concept of Person.Barbara de Mori - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):159-169.
The Language of Rights: Towards an Aristotelian-Thomistic Analysis.Michael Baur - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84:89-98.
Response to Dr. Gallup on animal rights.John F. Crosby - 1986 - Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):113-113.
The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview.Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo - 2015 - In Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 1-44.
The New Civil Rights of the Person.J. Alberto del Real Alcalá - 2014 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 100 (4):527-538.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-16

Downloads
36 (#1,462,917)

6 months
6 (#1,502,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references