Logical disputes and the a priori

Logique Et Analyse 59:347-366 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise. © 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

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Greg Priest
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.

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