Abstract

Moore’s early philosophical development can be traced to the developing mental science of the day and its impact on the study of the moral sciences at Cambridge. But this also intersected with the development of the ethical views that are more traditionally associated with Moore. Chapters 1 and 2 argue that philosophy (moral science) at Cambridge in Moore’s day was a blend of logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, which must be understood in a host of expressly nineteenth century ways. Thus, Moore’s introduction to philosophy at Cambridge cannot be characterised as stemming uniquely from the influence of Bradleyan Absolute Idealism. Chapter 3 makes the case that the anti-psychologistic perspective that played such a large role in the study of philosophy at Cambridge was no less featured—and no less influential on Moore—in the ethical views of his teacher Henry Sidgwick. This chapter examines not only Sidgwick’s views on Kant and on the nature of ethics, but also the evidence for Sidgwick’s influence via Moore’s lecture notes, essays, and other surviving material.