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A case for limited prescriptive normativism
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):264-265 (2011)
Abstract
Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advocate.Other Versions
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References found in this work
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & A. B. C. Research Group - 2000 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Peter M. Todd.
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.
A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors.Jerome R. Busemeyer, Emmanuel M. Pothos, Riccardo Franco & Jennifer S. Trueblood - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (2):193-218.
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