The infinite, the indefinite and the critical turn: Kant via Kripke models

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):743-773 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper aims to show that intuitionistic Kripke models are a powerful tool for interpreting Kant’s ‘Critical Philosophy’. Part I reviews some old work of mine that applies these models to provide a reading of Kant’s second antinomy about the divisibility of matter and to answer several attacks on Kant’s antinomies. But it also points out three shortcomings of that original application. First, the reading fails to account for Kant’s second antinomy claim that matter is divisible ‘ad infinitum’ and his first antinomy claim that empirical space extends only ‘ad indefinitum’. Secondly, in conformity with the ‘assertability’ heuristics for Kripke models, it attributes an assertability semantics to Kant. In fact, it attributes a pair of assertability semantics to Kant, but neither of these accords with modern assertabilism. And finally, one must wonder the propriety of using contemporary assertability and contemporary formal logic to save an eighteenth-century text. Part II goes historical to solve the problems about assertability. It outlines the Descartes–Leibniz dialectic about the infinite/indefinite distinction and demonstrates how each position reflects larger philosophical positions. It then demonstrates that Kant’s two versions of assertability and his version of the infinite/indefinite dichotomy emerge naturally from his attempts (pre-critical and then critical) to resolve a tension in Leibniz’s philosophy. In light of this demonstration, Part III adapts the Kripke model interpretation so that it does reflect that dichotomy. It then refines the Kripke semantics in order to model some of Kant’s signature critical doctrines, and it shows how Kant’s critical version of the infinite/indefinite distinction differs from all those of his predecessors and from his own pre-critical version. It also addresses the question of using contemporary logical machinery to interpret Kant. Part IV turns the tables and uses what we have learned about Kant and modern semantics in order to address a pair of issues in the contemporary critical foundations of logic.

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Carl Posy
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

References found in this work

Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.John Dewey - 1938 - New York, NY, USA: Henry Holt.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.John Dewey - 1938 - Philosophy 14 (55):370-371.
The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic.Michael Dummett - 1978 - In Truth and other enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 215-247.

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