Method, Madness, and Normativity

Philo 6 (2):235-248 (2003)
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Abstract

The method in question is conceptual analysis. The madness comes of its privileging received usage over theories that would revise our concepts so as to conform to the phenomena, not the other way around. The alternatives to capture-the-concept include revisionary theory-construction as practiced not only in the sciences but in some philosophies. I present a revisionary theory of an important kind of normativity -- the normativity involved in a biological adaptation's being for this or that -- which theory, I argue, undermines the received objections to there being any such normativity objectively in the world. So too for other kinds of normativity, including the moral, insofar as the objections to their objectivity have the same form and presuppositions

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References found in this work

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
From 'Is' to 'Ought'.Jason P. Roberts - 2017 - Philosophy, Theology and the Sciences 4 (2):203.

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