Abstract

La remisión del problema relativo al como de la captación de pensamientos a la psicología por parte de Frege ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración subjetiva está ausente en este autor. La crítica fregueana al psicologismo, sin embargo, se concentra en una crítica a la concepción psicologista de subjetividad y, correlativamente, implica una concepción de subjetividad novedosa en el contexto de la filosofía alemana de la segunda mitad del s. XIX que, como la husserliana, es no-naturalística e intencional.The assignment to psychology by Frege of the problem concerning how a thought is grasped has made the idea that all subjective considerations are absent from this author's work a dominant one amongst its critics. The fregean critic of psychologism, however, focusses on a critic of the psychologistic conception of the subjectivity and accordingly implies a conception of the subjective that is new in the context of the German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century and that is, like Husserl´s, non- naturalistic and intentional.