The non-existence of “inference claims”

In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans, Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Sic Sat. pp. 913-918 (2019)
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Abstract

Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.

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Gilbert Edward Plumer
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (PhD)

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References found in this work

Reasoning and Regress.Markos Valaris - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):101-127.
Principles of mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1938 - New York,: W.W. Norton & Company.
Informal Logic: Issues and Techniques.Wayne Grennan - 1997 - Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

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