Doubts about an argument from doubt

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):4145-4154 (2025)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to debate a version of the Cartesian argument from doubt for mind–body dualism which has been proposed recently by Ari Maunu in this journal (Inquiry, 61/4). After introducing Maunu's argument, one section is devoted to the critique of his argument. In this section, in addition to some other criticisms, we will consider a methodological parallel to Maunu's argument that is like his style of argumentation but is intended to draw the opposite conclusion. The discussion section includes Richard Swinburne's critical commentary on these two contrasting arguments. It also examines Swinburne's amended version of a Cartesian argument, which he believes to offer support for Maunu's position.

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Comparative ethics, ideologies, and critical thought.Roderick Hindery - 2008 - Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (2):215-231.

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References found in this work

The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 43 (2):399-403.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
Mind, Brain, and Free Will.Richard Swinburne - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Ground Functionalism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2021 - Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 1.
Ground Functionalism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford, GB: OUP. pp. 171-207.

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