Abstract

ABSTRACT While meliorism—a critical middle ground between optimism and pessimism—is a well-known approach within pragmatism, in particular, it has only rarely been examined in metaphysics. Starting from the distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics (P. F. Strawson), this article argues for a meliorist understanding of metaphysics as a continuously improved reflection on our human categorization of reality that cannot, however, be measured against any prestructured reality as it is in itself. Whereas the optimist idea of achieving the “best” metaphysical categorization—a “final” representational structure that would mirror the structure of the world in itself, as it were—is incoherent and should be replaced, melioristically, by the humanly achievable pursuit of better structures, this view should not be reduced to revisionary metaphysics, as metaphysicians may not agree on what makes a categorization better than its rivals. The article argues that metaphysical “betterment,” especially when pragmatically articulated, should be taken to a reflexive meta-level: what is pursued is a continuous amelioration of our self-understanding as agents viewing our world from within our engagement with it. This entangles metaphysics with ethics. Holistic pragmatism (Morton White) can be employed to make sense of this essentially humanistic idea.