Causal Probability

In On the Epistemology of Data Science: Conceptual Tools for a New Inductivism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 235-287 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this Chapter, a notion of causal probability is developed that fits with phenomenological science as well as with variational induction. In the proposed account, causation is used to distinguish between meaningful and accidental relationships, where meaningful probabilities are those that can be reliably used for prediction and possibly manipulation. In the spirit of variational induction, different types of circumstances or conditions are distinguished, in particular collective conditions, which remain constant in different trials of a given probabilistic phenomenon, and range conditions, which can vary and which determine the outcome in a specific trial of the probabilistic phenomenon. Causal probability is then based on the fundamental notion of causal symmetries. Essentially, a causal symmetry requires that the causal structure responsible for the probability distribution of outcome events is invariant under a relabeling of the outcome events. Causal symmetries determine the relative probabilities of the relabeled outcome events according to a rule that is termed the principle of causal symmetry, which is an objective counterpart to the principle of insufficient reason. Furthermore, the random nature of subsequent outcomes is guaranteed by the independence of trials, which is explicated in causal terms. A probability interpretation relying on causal symmetries can be seen as a generalization of objective interpretations in the tradition of the method of arbitrary functions. Frequencies and symmetries are the two fundamental types of evidence for probabilistic relationships. While frequency interpretations of objective probability are well known, the proposed account attempts to base objective probability solely on symmetries.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-06-21

Downloads
29 (#1,622,444)

6 months
17 (#698,773)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Wolfgang Pietsch
Technische Universität München

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references