- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Conjoining Meanings: Semantics Without Truth Values
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
Abstract
Paul M. Pietroski presents an ambitious new account of human languages as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. He argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions; meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Chapters
Similar books and articles
Paul M. Pietroski, "Conjoining Meanings: Semantics Without Truth Values.".David Lindeman - 2020 - Philosophy in Review 40 (4):159-161.
Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values.Jakub Szymanik - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):171-175.
Internalist Semantics: Comments on Paul Pietroski, Conjoining Meanings.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):745-751.
Compositionality and Expressive Power: Comments on Pietroski.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):295-310.
Précis of Conjoining Meanings.Paul M. Pietroski - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):271-282.
Generative Linguistics Meets Normative Inferentialism: Part 1.David Pereplyotchik - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):311-352.
The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it.John Collins - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):326-343.
Successful Semantics.D. H. Mellor - 2012 - In Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 60-77.
Analytics
Added to PP
2022-10-13
Downloads
160 (#260,179)
6 months
64 (#147,308)
2022-10-13
Downloads
160 (#260,179)
6 months
64 (#147,308)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences.Jake Quilty-Dunn, Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e261.
A Generalized Patchwork Approach to Scientific Concepts.Philipp Haueis - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (3):741-768.
Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (1):158-185.
Higher-order logic as metaphysics.Jeremy Goodman - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones, Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Try MATCHA Writer if you're interested in citing directly from PhilPapers and certifying your authorship.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation