Set Theory with Indeterminacy of Identity

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Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):473-495 (1999)
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Abstract

We presume a background theory which allows for indeterminacy of states of affairs involving objects, extending even to indeterminacy of identity between objects. A sentence reporting such an indeterminate state of affairs lacks truth-value. We extend this to a theory of sets, similar to ZFU, in which membership in, and identity between, sets may also be indeterminate

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10.1305/ndjfl/1012429714

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Terence Parsons
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Citations of this work

Identity and the Facts of the Matter.Graeme Forbes - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi, Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic. New York: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
X*—Worldly Indeterminacy of Identity.Terence Parsons & Peter Woodruff - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):171-192.
Entities without identity.Terence Parsons - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:1-19.
How to Reason About Vague Objects.Peter van Inwagen - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):255-284.

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