Abstract

This paper aims to show that between _Reasons and Persons_ and _On What Matters_ the orientation of Derek Parfit’s philosophy underwent a significant change. The approach of _Reasons and Persons_ is largely _revisionist_, which is exemplified by his reductionist account of personal identity. This account is omitted in _On What Matters_ apparently because it does not fit in with the _conciliationist_ project of this work. The aim of the first two volumes of that work is to show that, on the basis of a non-naturalist theory of normative reasons, three supposedly irreconcilable moral theories—rule-consequentialism, Kantian and Scanlonian contractualism—could converge to form a single Triple Theory. In the third volume, the conciliationist approach is carried further by Parfit’s attempt to show both that his metaethical position is in essential agreement with rivals, such as Gibbard’s expressivism, and to reconcile parts of common-sense morality and consequentialism in order to bring them together in the Triple Theory. This chapter argues that the failure of these attempts as well as the fact that the most controversial revisionist claims in _Reasons and Persons_ are left out throw doubt on the feasibility of Parfit’s conciliationalist undertaking.