Abstract

The objective of this paper is to critically assess some of Jonathan Dancy's views on reasons and motivation in Moral Reasons. It is argued, first, that his ‘gap’ theory of desire is untenable and that he would do better to adopt what he calls ‘pure ascriptionism’ which also denies that desires are motivational states distinct from beliefs. Second, the cognitivist theory of motivation is, however, less plausible than a conativist theory of motivation that takes desires to be distinct motivational states. Third, despite contrary announcements, Dancy does not espouse an internalist view of reasons. This is fortunate since it would be a belief internalism which is an incoherent position. His position is rather that of belief externalism coupled with a cognitivist theory of motivation. Fourth, this externalism is compatible with positions that are usually referred to as internalist, which, to distinguish them, might be called factually internalist.