Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the concept of phenomenological data by analyzing it in comparison with neurophenomenology and similar approaches that employ qualitative tools in empirical studies. I argue that although such data are often labeled as “phenomenological,” they do not meet the epistemological criteria of phenomenology properly understood. I distinguish the epistemological concept of consciousness (pure consciousness) from the psychological concept of the Self (empirical consciousness), and then suggest that neurophenomenology and related approaches are primarily focused on the Self. As a result, they fail to engage with consciousness as originally conceived by Husserl. After briefly introducing the core principles of phenomenology to demonstrate its focus on the universal structures of consciousness, I apply them to interpret two neurophenomenological experiments, so as to reveal the underlying epistemological difference. I identify contingent or empirical elements that are implicitly introduced into these experimental designs, which cannot be defined as universal or invariant. Based on these considerations, I propose that the pure level of analysis, characteristic of phenomenology, is more closely aligned with mainstream cognitive neuroscience than with neurophenomenology and qualitative methods. Finally, I will draw upon the previous discussions to propose an epistemological shift in experimental studies. New insights into the universal processing of consciousness are proposed as a more robust approach to investigating the universal brain processing. Keywords: Essences, Cognitive Neuroscience, Phenomenology, Neurophenomenology,