Abstract

The causal status of mental properties has been problematic on current versions of physicalism. Even if mental events are identifiable with physical events, this leaves the possibility that mental events are causally relevant only in virtue of their physical properties. The causal sufficiency of physical properties threatens to exclude any influence that mental properties may have, making them epiphenomenal with respect to behavior. In chapter 1, I examine this argument in detail and find it to be unsound. I also examine the suggestion, made by Stephen Yablo, that mental properties are related to their physical realizations as determinable to determinate, and that we must take advantage of this fact to show how the two types of properties may be compatible with respect to causal relevance. ;In chapter 2, I develop general criteria for testing the causal efficacy of properties. The result is a set of four conditions, each of which takes the form of a counterfactual statement. These counterfactuals, in turn, are interpreted according to a possible worlds semantics. The conditions as a whole are intended to capture the intuitive notion that the factors most responsible for an effect are those which are neither too abstract, nor too specific, relative to the effect in question. ;In chapter 3, I apply the criteria developed in chapter 2 to phenomenal properties, and then in chapter 4, to content properties. Mental properties of each type satisfy the conditions for efficacy in at least some cases, and even satisfy these conditions in cases in which the accompanying physical properties do not. I also apply the criteria to two special sorts of properties: schematic content properties, and wide content properties. Again, both types of properties are found to satisfy the conditions for efficacy in at least some cases. ;In comparison with my own account, I examine several alternative strategies which have been proposed for gaining causal relevance for mental properties, including those of Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, and Jaegwon Kim. Despite the merits of these alternative accounts, I find that they fail to validate our intuitive convictions about mental efficacy