The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

Alexy confronts the legal positivist view in this classic work of legal philosophy. He formulates an accessible concept of law that systematically links classical elements of legal positivism with nonpositivistic legal theory, challenging the prevailing orthodoxies of modern jurisprudence.

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reprint Alexy, Robert (2010) "The argument from injustice: a reply to legal positivism". Oxford University Press on Demand

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Citations of this work

Justice as Law's Constitutive Virtue: A Functional Reassessment.Emad H. Atiq - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Vol. 7.
The dual nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (2):167-182.
Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.
On the concept and the nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (3):281-299.
Legal Certainty and Correctness.Robert Alexy - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (4):441-451.

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