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Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation
Ratio Juris 31 (3):260-275 (2018)
Abstract
Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Fallibility of Officials.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2024 - In Thomas Bustamante, Saulo de Matos & André L. S. Coelho, Law, Morality and Judicial Reasoning: Essays on W.J. Waluchow's Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 23-40.
Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu‐als: Or, What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism.Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (1):26-47.
The Limits Of Intellectual Thought: A Daoist-Inspired Critique Of Analytic Standards In Philosophy.Jun Yi Tan - 2025 - The Red Stone 1 (SUPC 2025):6–55.
Replies to comments on The Functions of Law.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2019 - Jurisprudence 10 (2):255-280.
References found in this work
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Ethics in the public domain: essays in the morality of law and politics.Joseph Raz - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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