Abstract

In the first chapter of Hutto and Myin’s book Radical Enactivism, Hutto and Myin argue that representationalism is not definitive of all mentality. They assume computationalism presupposes representation. Computationalism does not presuppose representation. Computationalism can be defined as the manipulation of internal states according to an appropriate rule. These internal states are called internal semantics. If cognition is a computational process then metaphysically cognition doesn't presuppose representation. In this project I have decide to maintain an account of content in enactivism leaving me with a teleofuctional autopioetic account. In this project, (1) I will first offer a summary of radical enactivism. (2) I define functionalism, the mind is the functional organization of the brain (15). I compare functionalism, computationalism and cognition. (3) Using the functional view of computational individuation I compare the internal semantics of a system to the developmental explanatory thesis. (4) Finally, I use the example of procedural memory as an example of radical enactivism is human cognition.