Abstract

This paper aims to provide a minimalist meta-philosophical elucidation of ‘scientific pluralism’. I try to do so by pursuing its ‘lowest common denominator’, which I identify as inclusiveness. Although the term ‘scientific pluralism’ implies some unity among pluralists, no clear criteria exist for defining what constitutes a pluralist. As the primary characterisations are constructed negatively by opposing other viewpoints, it is essential to consider the positive aspect of the concept for a more precise and complete understanding. My primary objective here is to clarify and expand on the idea of ‘scientific pluralism’ by adopting a positive perspective. To accomplish this, I will adhere to the following steps: (1) I shall begin by introducing the topic and discussing the issue of the plurality of pluralisms; (2) I will subsequently highlight key examples of general scientific pluralisms, as they explicitly delineate themselves against “monism” and “relativism” (reconceptualised as ‘continuism’ and ‘discontinuism’); (3) Drawing upon the latter and what Kellert, Longino & Waters (Kellert, Scientific Pluralism 2006) refer to as the “pluralist stance”, I will advocate for inclusiveness as the ‘lowest common denominator’ of current scientific pluralisms. This will provide us with a means to adopt a positive stance, characterised by the acceptance of scientific multiplicity while including the opportune partial continuities and discontinuities; finally, (4) I will present concluding remarks.