The subtraction argument(s)

Dialectica 60 (2):145–156 (2006)
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Abstract

The subtraction argument aims to show that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. The argument has been endorsed by several philosophers. I show that there are currently two versions of the argument around, and that only one of them is valid. I then sketch the main problem for the valid version of the argument

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2009-01-28

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A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
There might be nothing.Thomas Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231-238.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.M. J. Cresswell - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):660.

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