FORMAL VALIDITY: MODEL-THEORETIC AND PROOF-THEORETIC CONCEPTIONS

In Filippo Ferrari, Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher & Florian Steinberger, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The usual approach to validity holds that an argument is valid in virtue of its form. This idea has been developed along two main lines: model-theoretic and proof-theoretic. Both frameworks presuppose a distinction between logical and non-logical vocabulary. This chapter introduces these two conceptions of validity and discusses their respective approaches to the demarcation question. We review two versions of the overgeneration challenge for the model-theoretic account, formulated in terms of isomorphism invariance. Similarly, we review two challenges faced by the proof-theoretic account, formulated in terms of the logical vocabulary’s inferential role. The chapter thus offers a comparative overview of the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic conceptions of formal validity.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Validity.Graham Priest - 2006 - In Doubt truth to be a liar. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 176-193.
Atomic Systems in Proof-Theoretic Semantics: Two Approaches.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Thomas Piecha - 2016 - In Ángel Nepomuceno Fernández, Olga Pombo Martins & Juan Redmond, Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 47-62.
Proof-Theoretic Semantics and Inquisitive Logic.Will Stafford - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1199-1229.
Revisiting Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Justification Procedures.Hermógenes Oliveira - 2017 - In Arazim Pavel & Lávička Tomáš, The Logica Yearbook 2016. College Publications. pp. 141-155.
Inference Rules and the Meaning of the Logical Constants.Hermógenes Oliveira - 2019 - Dissertation, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
Proof-theoretic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4879-4903.

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-06-16

Downloads
61 (#985,701)

6 months
61 (#150,715)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford
Owen Griffiths
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
What are logical notions?Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
Tonk, Plonk and Plink.Nuel D. Belnap - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):130-134.

View all 30 references / Add more references