Abstract

Frankfurt-style cases challenge the intuitively plausible “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (pap), which claims that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Most such cases have familiar responses by defenders of the pap, most notably the “dilemma defense” levied against traditional Frankfurt-style cases. However, one particular style – buffered alternatives cases – are even more challenging. The ingenuity of these cases lies in the introduction of a necessary-but-not-sufficient condition for doing otherwise, which acts as a buffer between the agent and potential alternatives. I develop a new dilemma for buffered alternatives Frankfurt-style cases which shows that they too fail to constitute counterexamples to the pap. I argue that the buffer, though it may remove certain alternative possibilities, shifts the locus of responsibility to earlier provisional or character-forming decisions. These prior, responsibility-conferring decisions cannot be said to have been made without the ability to do otherwise.