Grounding legal proof

Philosophical Issues 31 (1):280-298 (2021)
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Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 280-298, October 2021.

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10.1111/phis.12195

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References found in this work

Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.

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