‘The machine in the ghost’ ‘deconstructing the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article examines a paradox embedded in our concept of spatio-temporal events as they are singled out through phenomenal observation, and uses it to expose the objective and inescapable limits of any attempt to naturalize consciousness. I argue that reductions of phenomena to a supposedly more fundamental “physical” level inevitably fail, because the physical events described by scientific theories are themselves irreducibly phenomenal. On this basis, the so-called hard problem of consciousness is not a profound mystery but an illusion grounded in a category mistake: we search for a “machine in the ghost,” for a physical explanation within what is, both before and after any reduction, an irreducible phenomenal domain.

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (127):127-136.

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