Against hearing phonemes - A note on O’Callaghan

In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich, Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).

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Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum
University of Vienna

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References found in this work

Against hearing meanings.Casey O'Callaghan - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):783-807.
Experiencing speech.Casey O’Callaghan - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
Hearing it rain - Millikan on language learning.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - 2013 - Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 21.

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