人格同一性问题:对错误论的贯彻及其影响

Abstract

本文从对人类专名的外延性定义、以及人格同一性问题中著名的“分裂”思维实验出发,指出我们需要进一步澄清自我与人类专名等概念的内涵。在考虑了非还原论方案、动物主义方案、核心心理功能方案的进路后,笔者指出其中存在的缺陷,由此过渡到佩尔松提出的关于“同一性”问题的错误论,并分析了唯一性方案、心理连续性方案和心理相似性方案等三种错误论的方案。之后,本文进一步发展了心理连续性与心理相似性方案,指出其将会导致的对意向性问题的影响等多个后果,最终结合整体论语义学和语用分析将人格同一性问题解构为开放性的价值判断问题。最后,本文从模因论角度定性分析了前文提及方案的竞争优势,论述了核心心理功能方案与心理相似性方案何以可能成为较近和较远的未来中的主流观念。

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Annette C. Baier - 1984 - Philosophical Books 25 (4):220-224.
The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.

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